

# **COUNTERTERRORISM AND OPERATIONAL ART**

**A MONOGRAPH  
BY  
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Armor**



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
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
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## ABSTRACT

**Counterterrorism and Operational Art** by MAJ Christopher M. Hickey, USA, 58 pages.

Can operational art, an operational concept developed as an analytical tool for conventional conflict, be useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism? Operational art is the method of linking strategic objectives into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action. In conventional conflict, operational art enables a commander to best use the resources to accomplish the strategic objective. In the same respect, countering terrorism, which is beyond the capabilities of a single agency in the federal government, requires the most efficient use of limited resources to accomplish the strategic objective. This monograph investigates whether operational art is useful in countering terrorism.

The United State's counterterrorism effort was examined to determine if operational art applies to this form of asymmetric conflict. First, the historical development and fundamentals of operational art are explained. Next, the nature of interagency organizational procedures are described to highlight the differences of a system based on unity of effort instead of unity of command. With these procedures in mind, Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the nation's counterterrorist strategy, is explained to describe current interagency counterterrorist operations. Finally, operational art is used to analyze Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) to determine if it is as applicable to a terrorist asymmetrical threat as it is to a conventional threat. Specifically, PDD-39 was analyzed to see if the *ends*, *ways*, and *means* methodology and campaign design are feasible in linking strategic objectives to tactical action. An assumption was that the resolution required to examine the U.S. counter terrorist program at the operational level was available from unclassified sources. Understanding that the military's special operations forces, for example, have a supporting role in the program is important, specific secret operations are not.

This monograph concludes that operational art, an operational concept developed as an analytical tool for conventional conflict, is useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism. PDD-39 has identified the interagency conditions, the *ends*, to accomplish the nation's strategic counterterrorist objectives. It used campaign design, the *ways*, to accomplish the *ends*, through the *means* of the various government departments and agencies. Therefore, PDD-39 linked the strategic objectives into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action. Although countering terrorism is a much different environment than conventional conflict, the cognitive process of linking action on the ground to the strategic objectives are similar in purpose.

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## **Chapter One: Introduction**

Can operational art, an operational concept developed as an analytical tool for conventional conflict, be useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism? Operational art is the method of linking strategic objectives into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action.<sup>1</sup> In conventional conflict, operational art enables a commander to best use the resources to accomplish the strategic objective. In the same respect, countering terrorism, which is beyond the capabilities of a single agency in the federal government, requires the most efficient use of limited resources to accomplish the strategic objective. This monograph investigates whether operational art is useful in countering terrorism.

Terrorism is the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, especially for political purposes (see reference for other definitions of terrorism).<sup>2</sup> If “war is a continuation of policy by other means,” then is terrorism a form of the “other means” to achieve the policy?<sup>3</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, a Prussian military theorist who observed the Napoleonic Wars, developed this theory of war referring to the conventional war between nation-states. The “means,” in his conventional sense, was combat between armies. Webster defines combat as “to fight,” “active fighting between enemy forces,” or “any struggle or controversy.”<sup>4</sup> Therefore, could terrorism be a “means” of combat? Although Clausewitz was not referring to terrorism in his writings, one could argue that the definition of terrorism fits his theoretical definition of war.

A military officer and theorist who supports this view is Roger Trinquier. Trinquier commanded a French colonial parachute battalion during the Algerian

insurrection of the 1950s. He was considered an expert in counterinsurgency. Trinquier believed, "Terrorism is a weapon of warfare, which can neither be ignored nor minimized. ...Terrorism in the hands of our adversaries has become a formidable weapon of war that we can no longer permit ourselves to ignore."<sup>5</sup> Trinquier did not view the terrorist as a criminal, but as an opponent using a weapon of "other means" to fight a war. According to Trinquier there was no moral difference between a terrorist killing innocent women and children and the allied bombing of cities during World War II. One Algerian terrorist commented, "I had my bombs planted in the city because I didn't have the aircraft to transport them. ...I'm in a war you cannot blame me."<sup>6</sup> Consequently, Trinquier viewed that countering terrorism was a military and not a police responsibility.<sup>7</sup>

Lack of consensus of interpretations of terrorism make it difficult to understand. Some countries view terrorism in Trinquier's manner, while others regard it as a criminal activity to be countered by law enforcement agencies. The definition of terrorism theoretically fits Clausewitz's famous dictum, but countering it falls in the gray area of conflict, that is, between war and peace.<sup>8</sup> The United States official policy regards terrorism as a potential threat to national security as well as a criminal act. Domestically, the U.S. policy is clear and defined by law: counter terrorism is a mission of law enforcement.<sup>9</sup> This policy is based on The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 which limits the military to a supporting role to law enforcement within the United States.<sup>10</sup> Outside the United States, however, the military is not limited by this act. In 1993 the Clinton administration, in response to an assassination plot against former President Bush, ordered a cruise missile attack to destroy an Iraqi intelligence building.<sup>11</sup> Although this

example supports terrorism as an act of warfare, the primary U.S. counterterrorist tool is still the rule of law. A more typical example of U.S. policy is the FBI's 1995 overseas arrest of a terrorist suspected of bombing an airliner and the World Trade Center.<sup>12</sup> Inside the United States, law enforcement agencies enforce current U.S. law to counter terrorism. Where current laws are found lacking, new legislation, like the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996," is being developed (see reference for details of the new law).<sup>13</sup>

In contrast to the U.S.'s approach to counter terrorism, Trinquier's methods of combating terrorism were similar to the tactics of the terrorists. Torture, was among the tactics he advocated using against terrorists. To Trinquier, a counterterrorist force using torture was morally no different than an infantryman using a machinegun. He was eventually dismissed from the French army because his methods were not keeping with the values of the French nation.<sup>14</sup> Although Trinquier's methods of countering terrorists were considered extreme, it illustrates a dilemma at the heart of countering terrorism: the balance governments must achieve to effectively counter terrorism while maintaining the freedoms of the society they are trying to protect.

Maintaining this balance of providing security while protecting liberties is becoming more difficult because of the increasingly potential lethality of terrorist acts. As evident after the Oklahoma City bombing incident, the Congress passed a law giving law enforcement agencies increased powers to combat terrorists. Although there are indications that future acts of terrorism have the potential to cause many times the casualties of the Oklahoma city incident, this law was opposed by civil libertarians as



infringing on individual liberties.<sup>15</sup> The indications of increased lethality of terrorism are based on an assessment of the new strategic environment.

The United States emerged from a bipolar strategic environment of the Cold War to one in which it does not confront a “peer competitor - a hostile power of similar strength and capability - until the distant future.”<sup>16</sup> However, this does not mean the end of challenges to the interest of the United States. Most futurists see conflict (including terrorism) increasing due to the undampening effect of the end of the bipolar world. Other countries or groups, hostile to the United States, may resort to asymmetric means to counter the strengths of the U.S. military.<sup>17</sup> “An asymmetric threat is an adversary’s method of challenging an opponent by circumventing their enemy’s strengths and exploiting their vulnerabilities.”<sup>18</sup> Terrorism is an example of an asymmetric mean.

There are various categories of terrorism based on their source or sponsorship. The FBI defines two broad categories of terrorism: domestic and international. Domestic terrorism is a violent act carried out within the United States, without foreign direction, directed at the U.S. government or population.<sup>19</sup> An example of domestic terrorism was the Oklahoma City bombing of a federal building, which was perpetrated by an American citizen. A bombing conducted by a person or group with foreign ties is considered international terrorism. There are several Middle Eastern terrorist groups with cells within the United States which could conduct “international terrorism.”<sup>20</sup>

Within the definition of international terrorism, it is necessary to highlight two subcategories: state terrorism and transnational terrorism. State terrorism, as the name implies, is sponsored or supported by a nation. Hizballah (Party of God), a radical Islamic

group, closely allied and often directed by Iran, is an example of a state terrorist group. Transnational terrorism is not tied to or has minor ties to any specific nation. Unlike state terrorists, transnational terrorists are not controlled by a nation's policy and often operate out of hatred or religious reasons. An example of transnational terrorism is the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center perpetrated by the Ramzi Ahmed Yousef gang. "One common feature is that many of them (transnational terrorists)," according to Ambassador Wilcox, the State Department's Coordinator for International Terrorism, "espouse a very fanatic brand of Islam and a hatred of the West. They are a harder target to monitor and trace, and there are a lot of them out there."<sup>21</sup> Regardless of the type of terrorism, domestic or international, state or transnational; it must be countered.<sup>22</sup>

Collectively, counterterrorism and antiterrorism techniques encompass the larger DOD term called "combating terrorism." Counterterrorism measures are those offensive measures that combat terrorism. Counterterrorism encompasses measures to prevent, deter, and respond to a terrorist incident.<sup>23</sup> FBI agents apprehending a terrorist or rescuing hostages are conducting a counterterrorism act. The U.S. air raid on Libya in 1986, in retaliation for the killing of U.S. service members in Germany, is another example of a counterterrorism act. In contrast, defensive measures are defined as antiterrorism. Metal and bomb detectors at airports, and improving personnel awareness and knowledge of personnel protection techniques are examples of antiterrorism techniques.<sup>24</sup> Currently, the U.S. is preparing to combat increasing lethal methods of terrorism.

Of growing concern to the United States is the asymmetric tactic of terrorists using weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A WMD is a weapon capable of large

destruction and/or causing a large number of casualties. By definition WMD can be nuclear, chemical, or biological. Large conventional explosives are not currently classified as WMD.<sup>25</sup> Of the three types of WMD, biological weapons (BW) and chemical weapons (CW) are considered the most likely to be used by terrorists. BW and CW have long been considered a poor nation's (or groups) nuclear weapon. In comparison to constructing a nuclear weapon, BW and CW are cheaper to build, the materials more available, and require less equipment and knowledge to construct.<sup>26</sup> Additionally, an individual lethal dose of a biological or chemical agent weighs less than paper clip.<sup>27</sup> A small plane could, theoretically, properly disperse enough anthrax (a type of BW) to kill millions of people in a large metropolitan area.<sup>28</sup>

This theoretical attack became reality, to a much lesser extent, with the nerve agent chemical attack on the subway system in Tokyo, Japan in March 1995. The terrorists placed six devices of diluted sarin, a lethal nerve agent (CW), on crowded subway trains during the morning rush-hour.<sup>29</sup> The attack, perpetrated by the Japan's Aum Shinrikyo religious cult, killed twelve people and injured over 5,000. This religious cult is thought to have over 40,000 members worldwide and has assets of over one billion dollars. The cult's ultimate goal is to promote a war between the United States and Japan, allowing it to take power in the aftermath.<sup>30</sup> The Japanese government took aggressive counter and antiterrorist measures to prevent this from happening again. Japanese police raided the cult's compound and seized thousands of tons of chemicals used to make the sarin nerve agent. In the compound, the police discovered a remotely piloted vehicle

which could be used to dispense the CW. Additionally, as an antiterrorist measure, the Japanese government outlawed the possession of sarin.<sup>31</sup>

There is a wide range of opinion on the implications of this type of use of WMD in the conduct of terrorism. Some believe that this is the terrorist tactic of the future. Senator Sam Nunn advocated such a view when he stated, "The activities of the Aum should serve as a warning to us all."<sup>32</sup> Secretary of Defense Cohen recently stated, "This scenario of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon in the hands of a terrorist cell or rogue nation is not only plausible, it's quite real."<sup>33</sup> Others believe the current terrorism threat is low because counterterrorism measures implemented over the last couple of decades are working. Larry Johnson, a former Deputy Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department, believes that "sound government policy, aggressive law enforcement, and the breakup of the Soviet Union" are reasons that terrorism against the United States is at a twenty-five year low.<sup>34</sup> Additionally, many experts agree that most terrorist organizations have shown little interest in using WMD to promote their cause. If terrorism is a political act, then using such a powerful weapon would discredit the cause of most domestic and state terrorists. These experts contend that transnational terrorists would be the most likely perpetrator of a WMD terrorist act.<sup>35</sup> Transnational terrorists are thought to be more capable of unrestrained violence because they are not subject to the restraints of a sponsoring state's policies. Currently, however, conventional explosives continue to be the weapon of choice for terrorists.<sup>36</sup> Only time will tell which view is correct. It is clear, however, that the potential of a terrorist act involving a WMD has caught the attention of the United States and is generating a response (see figure 1).

“I William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and of the means of delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and hereby declare a **national emergency** to deal with that threat (see reference for details).”

**Figure 1: Executive Order 12938, November 14, 1994<sup>37</sup>**

The President’s National Security Strategy describes the U.S. response to an asymmetric terrorist challenge as an integrated approach, crossing agency boundaries.<sup>38</sup> The challenge facing operational planners is how to develop this “integrated approach” in countering terrorism. Operational art, perhaps, is the appropriate cognitive process to develop a campaign plan in this gray area of conflict.

The United State's counterterrorism effort is examined to determine if operational art applies to this form of asymmetric conflict. First, the historical development and fundamentals of operational art are explained. Next, the nature of interagency organizational procedures is described to highlight the differences of a system based on unity of effort instead of unity of command. With these procedures in mind, Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39), the nation’s counterterrorist strategy, is explained to describe the current interagency counterterrorist strategy. Finally, operational art is used to analyze Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) to determine if it is as applicable to a terrorist asymmetrical threat as it is to a conventional threat. Specifically, PDD-39 is analyzed to see if the *ends*, *ways*, and *means* methodology and campaign design are evident in linking strategic objectives to tactical action. An assumption is that the resolution required to examine the U.S. counterterrorist program at the operational level is available from unclassified sources. Understanding that the military’s special

operations forces, for example, have a supporting role in the program is important, specific secret operations are not.

This monograph is about how to think at the operational level to counter terrorism. It does not make judgments on whether countering terrorism is a military or law enforcement mission or suggest new organizations or command structures. Nor does it limit its perspective to the military, but also looks at the interagency issues of countering terrorism.

## **Chapter Two: Operational Art**

Operational art is a relatively new concept in U.S. Army doctrine. Although operational art was only introduced into Army doctrine in the 1986 version of FM 100-5, Operations, it is not a new concept in warfare.<sup>39</sup> Some say that signs of operational art were apparent during Napoleon's campaign against Austria in 1809.<sup>40</sup> Others say that operational art emerged during the American Civil War.<sup>41</sup> Despite these historical examples of operational art, it was not till the 1920s, in the Soviet Union, that the theory of operational art was developed to describe this change in the nature of modern warfare.<sup>42</sup> Soviet General-Major Alexander Svechin (1848-1938) first coined the term "operational art" to refer to a third category of art to link strategy and tactics. He developed this theory as a result of his analysis of the Russo-Japanese War and World War One. Svechin concluded that the Russian military objectives in these wars were not linked to accomplish the nation's strategic goals.<sup>43</sup> Today, theater commanders and their staffs use operational art "to consider the *ends* they must achieve, the *ways* to achieve

those ends, and how to use the *means* available.”<sup>44</sup> The changing nature of warfare recognized by Svechin did not happen over night, but developed over a span of a century.

Operational art developed as result of the changing nature of warfare in the nineteenth century. A new theoretical concept developed out of the need to make sense of the rapid changes in warfare caused by demographics, geopolitics, and technology. Prior to the 19th century there were two levels of war. This form of warfare was called classical strategy. In this type of warfare, armies maneuvered to contact and fought a decisive battle. Logistically, armies could supply themselves by living off the land. The king or sovereign of a nation, the strategic level, could physically observe and command his units, the tactical level, on the battlefield. To use an analogy, imagine the battlefield as a chess board. In a game of chess the opposing sides are in view of each other and moves are within each player’s mental capacity to judge and implement. The player can command and control his pieces because they are relatively close together. A pawn can move one space and can only capture one piece at a time. Imagine, however, if the pawns and other pieces became more powerful and there were many more pieces to control. Assume a pawn could now, for example, take out ten pieces. This new capability would cause the other side to spread out to protect their pieces. A pawn could now occupy a space of ten chess squares instead of only one. The expanding of the board and the addition of many new pieces would greatly change the nature of the game. With the board ten times bigger and the addition of many other boards due to the increase in pieces, a single player would no longer be able to observe the chess match. He would be forced to

give operational guidance to subordinate players to control the various armies of chess pieces in order to win the match.

The standard chess match is analogous to classical warfare as it existed prior to the 19th century. But even prior to the 1800s, new technologies were emerging that would change the classical nature of warfare. The advent of the long bow in the 14th century and the advent of firearms in the 16th century started causing commanders to stand back and direct battles.<sup>45</sup> But soldiers still fought in tightly formed formations because their muskets had short range and were inaccurate. Additionally, the formations were small because the soldiers, who were mercenaries or conscripts, tended to run away if not tightly controlled. Classical strategy reached its pinnacle under Napoleon in the early 19th century. Napoleon was barely able to maintain control over the expanding battlefield. In 1805 he ably commanded 85,000 men at the Battle of Austerlitz. However, in 1806, he lost control of over one-third of his 150,000 men at the Battle of Jena.<sup>46</sup> Sixty years later, at the Battle of Koniggratz, both sides had over 440,00 men.<sup>47</sup> Warfare, and how to control it, was changing. A new "operational" level of war was growing necessary to translate strategic goals into tactical direction.

The "operational" level of war was caused by demographics, geopolitics, and technology.<sup>48</sup> Demographically, at the turn of the nineteenth century there was a rise in population levels throughout the world. Nations now had the ability to field not only one army, but several armies. "Each army could conduct its own campaign and a nation could conduct several campaigns."<sup>49</sup> Geopolitically, with the rise in the size of armies, nations began to look to other nations for alliances. Small nations could not compete against the



military power of a larger nation without the benefit of an alliance. Due to the alliance system, opposing armies were forced to become even bigger. Technologically, the industrial revolution made the machines of war more lethal.

The invention of the rifled musket and the Minie ball bullet, in the middle of the 19th century, caused the battlefield to become much more lethal over the old smoothbore musket.<sup>50</sup> In the later part of the 19th century, these rifles were improved by incorporating a breechloading system and later a magazine. Soldiers were now able to reload in the prone position and fire more rapidly. Like the analogy with the chess pawn becoming more powerful and occupying ten spaces instead of one, the weapons of the late 19th century soldiers increased in lethality and consequently soldiers were forced to spread out to survive. Along with the increasing size of armies came technology that could command, transport, and supply them.

The railroad and the telegraph were the technical solution that enabled commanders to operate such large armies over a huge battlefield. About the time of the American Civil War, armies became too big to live off the land as they did in the age of Napoleon and the railroads enabled them to transport soldiers and supplies over great distances. During the age of classical warfare, armies could fight only during the seasons that they could gather food. However, in this new age, armies could fight year round since their supplies were transported to them. Commanders depended on their supplies being transported from a base of operations to his army in the field. All these demographic, geopolitical, and technological changes made the decisive battle of classical warfare no longer probable.

Campaign plans in this new era of warfare had to clearly establish how to achieve the strategic objectives in military terms. A theater commander had to link the *ends*, *ways*, and *means* of the campaign to develop his course of action (see figure 2).


**Ends:** Military conditions which will achieve the strategic objectives in the theater of war or theater of operations.

**Ways:** The sequence of actions which are most likely to produce these conditions.

**Means:** The military resources, within established limitations, to accomplish this sequence of actions.

**Figure 2: Ends, Ways, Means<sup>51</sup>**

As an analytical tool to determine the “ways”, certain concepts of campaign design began to surface: *center of gravity*, *decisive points*, *lines of operations*, and *culminating point* (see figure 3). The *ends*, *ways*, and *means* are not separate concepts, but are linked together. Grant’s 1863 Vicksburg campaign will be used to illustrate these concepts of operational art.



**Figure 3: Operational Art**

The Vicksburg campaign resulted from the determination by the Union and the Confederacy of the need to control the Mississippi River, the *superhighway* during

the Civil War (see figure 4 for map of the western theater). Like offramps on modern highways, the Mississippi had tributaries; the Missouri, the Illinois, the Ohio, the White, the Arkansas, the Red, and the Yazoo Rivers, that flowed into the interior of the country. This river superhighway transportation network made the Mississippi River Valley the fastest growing section of the country. To the Union, the Mississippi River was a transportation artery that linked the West with the ports in the Gulf and the Atlantic seaboard.<sup>52</sup> Politically and economically it was important that the Union maintain the ties to these territories. To the South, the Mississippi linked the eastern half to the western half of the Confederacy. Both sides recognized that the river network constituted avenues of approach that the Union could use to invade the South. Consequently, control of the Mississippi became contested.<sup>53</sup> The key point on the Mississippi was the town of Vicksburg. Vicksburg had a railroad that could transport supplies, brought down the Mississippi and her tributaries, all over the Confederacy. From a strategic perspective, the Union wanted to control the Mississippi to maintain its ties to the West and to deny the South the benefits of the river network. Lincoln recognized the importance of Vicksburg when he stated, "Let us get Vicksburg and all that country is ours. The war can never be brought to a close until the key is in our pocket."<sup>54</sup>



Figure 4: Western Theater<sup>55</sup>

By answering the questions of *ends*, *ways*, and *means*, a commander “articulates a vision for warfighting, a statement of his intent for the campaign, and a command structure within which he will execute the plan.”<sup>56</sup> The military condition that would achieve the strategic objective of control of the Mississippi, the *ends*, was for the Union, the seizure of Vicksburg. The sequence of actions most likely to produce the control of Vicksburg, the *ways*, were the courses of action the Union executed. The military resources used, the *means*, were the army and naval forces and their supplies. The *ends*, *ways*, and *means* are interlinked and supporting concepts. If these concepts are not interlinked and supporting, then it is unlikely the objective can be achieved. Initially, the Union understood the *ends*, the seizure of Vicksburg, but their *ways* and *means* were insufficient to accomplish the *ends*.

The center of gravity is the key concept for understanding campaign design. The joint and army definition vary slightly, but the common theme is the center of gravity is that which gives one power (see figure 5).

“Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”

**Joint Definition<sup>57</sup>**

“The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. It is that characteristic, capability, or location from which enemy and friendly forces derive their freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight.”

**U.S. Army Definition<sup>58</sup>**

**Figure 5: Center of Gravity**

This power may be freedom of action, as in depending on lines of communication for supplies to supply the army. Or it may be the physical strength of the army or its will to fight. In the Vicksburg campaign, control of the town of Vicksburg was the Confederate center of gravity and Grant’s military forces the Union center of gravity. Vicksburg, as a


transportation and supply hub, gave the Confederates freedom of action and its strategic importance to the Confederacy gave the defenders the will to fight. To achieve victory, Grant had to seize control of Vicksburg and his military forces were the physical strength that would enable him to accomplish this. To defeat Grant, the Confederates would have to defeat his army.

To make best use of his resources, an operational commander focuses his campaign on the center of gravity. If there is enough strength the enemy center of gravity can be attacked directly. The Union first tried this direct attack in May of 1862 when Union naval commander Sam Phillips Lee and 1,400 troops under BG Williams arrived at Vicksburg under a flag of truce to demand the town's surrender. The Confederates refused to surrender and the Union did not have sufficient force to seize the town.<sup>59</sup> The Union tried again in June and December, 1862 to seize the town, but failed for the same reasons, insufficient forces.<sup>60</sup>

If the attacker does not enough strength the enemy center of gravity may have to be attacked indirectly. After several failed indirect attempts in the winter of 1863, Grant, on March 29, developed the concept that was to eventually succeed.<sup>61</sup> The center of gravity for this concept remained Vicksburg, but he would attack decisive points to achieve the center of gravity. Decisive points are the keys to influencing the center of gravity (see figure 6).


“A point, if retained, that provides a commander with a marked advantage over his opponent. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature but could include other physical elements such as enemy formations, command posts, and communication nodes.”

**Figure 6: Decisive Points<sup>62</sup>**



There will generally be more decisive points than a commander can seize, retain, or destroy with his available resources. Therefore, a commander must decide which decisive points are the most important in order to weaken and defeat the enemy center of gravity.

The problem Grant faced was the Confederates, under command of General Pemberton, had reinforced Vicksburg with heavy gun batteries which overlooked the Mississippi. This made transporting troops on the river past the batteries too risky. Therefore Grant decided to bypass Vicksburg by going around it from the south and attacking it in the rear from the east (see figure 7 for map of the Vicksburg campaign).<sup>63</sup> To attack Vicksburg, the Confederate center of gravity, Grant had to attack the decisive point of the railroad between Vicksburg and Jackson in order to cut the Confederate lines of operation and prevent reinforcements into Vicksburg.



**Figure 7: Grant's Vicksburg Campaign<sup>64</sup>**

Lines of operation are another key concept of campaign design (see figure 8).

"A directional orientation that connects the force with its base of operations and its objective. . . . There are two types of lines of operation: interior and exterior. A force operates on interior lines when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on exterior lines when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger force but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker opponent."

**Figure 8: Lines of Operation<sup>65</sup>**

The Union's exterior lines of operation stretched from their base at Memphis, down the Mississippi to their objective of Vicksburg. Closely related to lines of operation are lines of communication. Lines of communication connect the base of operations with the army in the field. Lines of communication are the routes which the army and its supplies move. The lines of operation and communication could be the same. In the Union's earlier



campaigns where they tried to attack Vicksburg directly, this was the case. Both the lines of operation and communication began at the base in Memphis to the objective of Vicksburg. In Grant's final campaign to take Vicksburg, his lines of communication began from Memphis, down the Mississippi, on wagon trails on the west side of the Mississippi, across the river at Grand Gulf, and over land to their forces operating east of Vicksburg. For the Confederates, attacking these lines of communication would be a decisive point in attacking the Union center of gravity, Grant's military forces. Interdicting the Union's lines of communication affects the physical strength of their military forces. If the Union lines of communication were cut, then their forces would be severed from their base of Memphis, which was their source of supplies. On the other hand, if the Union could sever the railway running into Vicksburg, the Confederate lines of communication would be cut.

This illustrates the final concept of campaign design, culminating point (see figure 9).

"The point in time and space when the attacker can no longer accomplish his purpose or when the defender no longer has the ability to accomplish his purpose. This can be due to factors such as combat power remaining, logistic support, morale, and fatigue."

**Figure 9: Culminating Point<sup>66</sup>**

An attacker wants to seize the objective before he culminates. The defender wants to cause the attacker to culminate prior to attaining his objective. Grant was taking a risk by having extended lines of communication, but mitigated the risk by leaving a corps to protect his base in Memphis, a brigade to protect the crossing sites at Grand Gulf, and a division to protect his supply trains traveling behind his army.<sup>67</sup> Eventually he shortened his lines of communication by seizing key terrain at Haynes' Bluff. This key terrain

enabled the transports from Memphis to bring his supplies close to the Union army which were, by then, outside Vicksburg.<sup>68</sup> All the preceding concepts of campaign design are considered when developing the *ways* to employ the *means* to accomplish the *ends*.

The outcome in the Vicksburg campaign was that Grant was successful in protecting his lines of operation and communication while severing those of the Confederates. Grant was then able to keep his force of 44,000 concentrated and defeat the unconcentrated Confederate force of equal strength. The concentrated Union force won a series of battles against the unconcentrated Confederate forces at the Battles of Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion Hill, and the Big Black River from 1 to 17 May, 1863. Grant was able to successfully integrate the Union Navy, under Rear Admiral Porter, to support his river crossing, maintain the river lines of communication, and open a new line of communication at Haynes' Bluff. He successfully incorporated deception by employing a demonstration with Sherman's corps and Porter's gunboats north of Vicksburg, while he crossed the Mississippi with his main force south of Vicksburg.<sup>69</sup> A series of Union cavalry raids to the north and east of Vicksburg confused the Confederates as to where the Union main effort was and caused Pemberton to split his forces.<sup>70</sup> Consequently, Pemberton retreated to Vicksburg and was held under siege by Grant from 18 May to 4 July. With his lines of communication severed, Pemberton's forces reached their culminating point and surrendered on 4 July, 1863.<sup>71</sup>

The Vicksburg campaign differed dramatically then the classical strategy of Napoleonic era. If the Union had used classical strategy at Vicksburg, it would have fought one decisive battle to achieve their objective. Because the Vicksburg center of

gravity was too formidable to directly attack, Grant attacked it indirectly focusing on a series of decisive points. He was victorious in a series of battles while protecting his own center of gravity. He achieved the *ends*, the control of the Mississippi, with the unity of effort between the concentrated Army and the Union Navy, the *means*. He accomplished this through a series of battles, the *ways*, to seize Vicksburg.

Can this operational tool of determining *ends*, *ways*, and *means* to translate strategic objectives into tactical action be applied to countering an asymmetrical threat of terrorism? To answer this, the *ends*, *ways*, and *means* of operational art will be used to determine whether the strategic guidance provided in PDD-39 can be developed into an operational level campaign plan. Before examining PDD-39 it is important to understand how interagency system operates.

### **Chapter Three: Interagency Organizational Procedures and the United States Counterterrorism Program**

The chain of command used in a purely military operation is normally much clearer than those in the interagency operations. In conducting military operations, unity of command is an important principal of war. Unity of command means all the forces are under one responsible commander who has the "requisite authority to direct all forces in pursuit of a unified purpose."<sup>72</sup> During the Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf, as Commander-in-Chief U.S. Central Command (CINCCENTCOM), commanded all U.S. forces. In the interagency environment of counterterrorism, however, unity of command is not always possible. There is no Commander-in-Chief - Counterterrorism. Despite spending more than any other federal department on combating terrorism, the DOD has only a supporting role. Thus in an interagency environment, unity of effort, coordination

through cooperation and common interests, becomes paramount.<sup>73</sup> Before examining the U.S. counter terrorist program from an operational perspective, one must understand interagency organizational procedures.

There are more than 40 federal agencies, bureaus, and offices that combat terrorism (see figure 10).<sup>74</sup> One of the challenges of any organization is allocating resources. For the military, allocating resources is one way of weighing the main effort. Recently, the General Accounting Office (GAO) stated that there is probably no way of accurately determining the cost of countering terrorism.<sup>75</sup> The resources used to combat terrorism are also used for other purposes.

Department of State	Department of Treasury
Department of Justice	<i>U.S. Customs Service</i>
<i>Drug Enforcement Agency</i>	<i>Bureau of Alcohol,</i>
<i>Federal Bureau of Investigation</i>	<i>Tobacco and Firearms</i>
<i>Immigration and Naturalization Service</i>	<i>U.S. Secret Service</i>
Department of Commerce	Department of Transportation
Department of Defense	<i>Federal Aviation Administration</i>
<i>Defense Intelligence Agency</i>	<i>U.S. Coast Guard</i>
<i>Advanced Research Projects Agency</i>	Environmental Protection Agency
<i>Defense Information Systems Agency</i>	Federal Emergency Management Agency
<i>Defense Special Weapons Agency</i>	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
<i>U.S. Special Operations Command</i>	U.S. Postal Service
<i>Unified CINCs</i>	National Security Council
<i>Military Departments</i>	Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Energy	National Security Agency
Department of Health and Human Services	National Reconnaissance Office

**Figure 10: Federal organizations involved with combating terrorism<sup>76</sup>**

Are Navy ships and cruise missiles, recent counterterrorist weapons, counted as a conventional war or counterterrorist resource? Despite this difficulty, GAO estimates the federal government annually spends about 7 billion dollars on combating terrorism.<sup>77</sup> Estimating cost is but one example of the difficulties encountered with interagency operations.

How are all these agencies and billions of dollars used effectively and efficiently?

It is probably incorrect to say no one is in charge of the federal counterterrorism effort.

The President of the United States is in charge. The President is responsible for national strategic unity of effort to coordinate the actions of the executive agencies of the federal government. The President has a personal national security staff for assistance.

At the strategic level, The National Security Council (NSC) assists the president in integrating all aspects of national security policy - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic. The President chairs the NSC, with other members including the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Treasury, the U.S. Representative to the United Nations, the National Security Advisor, the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, and the White House Chief of Staff. This is the highest level of the NSC and is known as the Principals Committee (NSC/PC). The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) are advisors to the NSC/PC. Other department members may be included to these meetings on an ad hoc basis. It is at the Principal Committee level that key policy decisions are made. A step below the Principals Committee is the Deputies Committee. This committee mirrors the membership and function of the Principals Committee, except at the deputy secretary level, a rank below the department secretaries. A step below the Deputies Committee are the Interagency Working Groups (NSC/IWGs).<sup>78</sup>

At the operational level, the Interagency Working Groups are somewhat analogous to a military joint staff. The IWGs are where the coordination among the agencies is accomplished. There are standing and ad hoc IWGs. Each IWG is focused on

specific national security issues. There are four IWGs, for example, that focus with terrorism (see figure 11).<sup>79</sup>

- \* Interagency Working Group on Counterterrorism; chaired by the State Department
- \* Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism; chaired by the CIA
- \* Senior Interagency Coordination Group on Terrorism, SICG (Domestic Consequence Management); chaired by FEMA
- \* Consequence Management Working Group focused on International Incidents; chaired by the State Department

**Figure 11: Counterterrorism Interagency Working Groups**

Interagency Sub-Groups are formed when there are too many issues for IWGs to focus on. It is at the Sub-Group level that the detailed NSC interagency staff coordination is accomplished. The IWG on Counterterrorism, for example, had Sub-Groups focused on terrorism-related research and development activities, exercises, international consequence management, and transportation. The Exercise Sub-Group is co-chaired by the FBI and the State Department and consists of representatives of 20 federal agencies to coordinate interagency counterterrorists exercises.<sup>80</sup> Just as a military staff and subordinate commanders are focused by a common purpose and goals set by the commander, the separate agencies are also focused.

The NSC committees and IWGs develop consensus on goals of an operation and establish interagency responsibilities. This often results in a Presidential Decision Directive (PDD). A PDD is analogous to a CINC's campaign plan. It clearly states the President's strategic objectives, the concept for reaching those objectives, and assigns tasks to the various agencies. The PDD is an example of a key authority of the NSC. Only the NSC is authorized to provide direction to the executive departments.<sup>81</sup> This means,

for example, that the FBI can not direct the DOD or any other department. Action at this IWG-level is not directive but comes from coordination and cooperation.

In addition to providing the strategic goals and objectives, the PDD identifies the lead agency for a particular task. A lead agency coordinates the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency chairs the IWG for the particular operation in addition to determining the agenda, ensuring cohesion among other agencies, and being responsible for implementing decisions.<sup>82</sup> There are four main lead agencies in respect to counterterrorism: the State Department, the FBI, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA).

The State department is the lead agency for countering terrorism outside the United States. It has formed an Office for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism to accomplish this. The Coordinator of Counterterrorism (S/CT) chairs the IWG on terrorism. The CIA is the lead agency for counterterrorist intelligence collection overseas. The DOD, as a supporting agency, operating through the National Command Authority (the President and the Secretary of Defense), the unified CINCs, and the U.S. Special Operations Command, is not limited by domestic laws in conducting counterterrorist operations overseas. The counterterrorism program within the United States, due to law restrictions, is a separate effort.

The Department of Justice, operating through the FBI, is the lead agency for counterterrorism and intelligence collection within the United States.<sup>83</sup> The FBI's National Security Division has a Domestic Counterterrorism Office and an International

Counterterrorism Office. As the lead domestic counterterrorist agency, the FBI is leading an interagency planning effort to develop a contingency plan for WMD incident response. The FAA is the lead agency for hijackings of aircraft. Once the aircraft hatch doors are opened, lead agency responsibility belongs to the FBI.<sup>84</sup> For domestic support, the Director of Military Support (DOMS) coordinates DODs support with the other agencies. When DOD receives a request for support from civilian authorities, it is screened for legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness. The Secretary of Defense personally oversees the DOD's response to terrorists attacks, internationally and domestically.<sup>85</sup> He approves the employment of resources to the civilian authorities and use of lethal force by the armed services in counterterrorist operations.<sup>86</sup> To assist the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with synchronizing the Joint Staff in combating terrorism, the Deputy Director for Combating Terrorism (J-34) was recently created.<sup>87</sup>

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency for managing the consequences of domestic terrorist attacks. FEMA has developed a series of contingency plans, the Federal Response Plan (FRP), to integrate 28 departments and agencies to respond to most natural and manmade domestic emergencies. FEMA has recently added an annex to the FRP to address a domestic WMD disaster.<sup>88</sup>

In the event of a terrorism incident both the State Department and the FBI have the capability, at the tactical level, to form interagency emergency response teams to support on the on-site commander. These emergency team leaders advise the on-site commander on the interagency capabilities available to him. The composition of these



teams is based on the nature of the incident. The State's team is called the Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST). The FBI's team is called the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST).<sup>89</sup> Whether at the strategic-level with the NSC, the operational-level with IWGs, or the tactical-level with FESTs and DESTs, interagency operations are not unlike operations the military has performed in the past.

Interagency operations are similar to coalition warfare for the military. Each country of Desert Storm Gulf Coalition came together for a common purpose, but with different agendas, resources, capabilities, competencies, culture, and decision-making procedures. U.S. military joint publications offers relevant guidance to instill unity of effort for both coalition and interagency operations (see figure 12).

- Define the problem in clear and unambiguous terms agreed to by all participants
- Define the objective
- Establish a common frame of reference
- Develop courses of action/options
- Capitalize on experience
- Establish responsibility
- Plan for the transition of key responsibilities, capabilities, and functions
- Direct all means toward unity of effort

**Figure 12: Basic Steps to Building and Maintaining Coordination<sup>90</sup>**

The coalition campaign plan is what unites the various countries together toward a common goal. The Presidential Decision Directive has a similar effect in uniting the efforts of U.S. agencies.

### **Presidential Decision Directive 39, U.S. Counterterrorism Policy**

The Presidential Decision Directive 39 - U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (PDD-39) provides the strategic policy to integrate the efforts of the federal agencies. The stated strategic objective of the United States in regards to terrorism is to "*use all appropriate*

*means to deter, defeat and respond to all terrorist attacks on our territory and resources, both people and facilities, wherever they occur.”*<sup>91</sup> The U.S. has four counterterrorist policies to support the strategic objective (see figure 13).

1. “Employ efforts to deter, preempt, apprehend and prosecute terrorists.”
2. “Work closely with other governments to carry out our counterterrorism policy and combat terrorist threats against them.”
3. “Identify sponsors of terrorists, isolate them, and ensure they pay for their actions.”
4. “Make no concessions to terrorists.”

**Figure 13: United States Counterterrorist Policies**<sup>92</sup>

PDD-39 incorporates the strategic objective and the counterterrorist policies into an operational concept.

PDD-39s strategy to counter terrorism is through the implementation of the four main operational strategies (see figure 14).

- **Reducing the nation's vulnerabilities to terrorist attack**
- **Deterring terrorist from attacking.**
- **Responding to a terrorist attack.**
- **Managing the consequence of a terrorist's employment of a WMD.**

**Figure 14: PDD-39 Operational Counterterrorist Strategies**<sup>93</sup>

Many programs, activities, legislation, coordination, and organizations have been implemented, throughout the federal, state, and local governments as a result of these strategies.

### **Reduce Vulnerabilities**

PDD-39 has seven strategies to reduce the United States vulnerabilities to terrorism (see figure 15). These strategies are antiterrorist measures designed to reduce vulnerabilities of citizens, facilities, and transportation networks and to inhibit terrorists freedom of movement and action. These strategies will not prevent terrorist acts, but are designed to make it more difficult for terrorists to succeed in their actions.

1. Review the vulnerability of government facilities and critical national infrastructure
2. Expand the program of counterterrorism.
3. Reduce vulnerabilities of affecting civilian personnel/facilities abroad and military personnel/facilities.
4. Reduce vulnerabilities affecting U.S. airports, aircraft/passengers and shipping, and provide appropriate security measures for other modes of transportation.
5. Exclude/deport persons who pose a terrorist threat.
6. Prevent unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, and protect the President and other officials against terrorist attack.
7. Reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international terrorism through intelligence collection/analysis, counterintelligence and covert actions.

**Figure 15: Strategies to Reduce Vulnerabilities<sup>94</sup>**

PDD-39 directed a study of the vulnerability of the nation's critical infrastructure.

A presidential commission on critical infrastructure spent fifteen months evaluating the vulnerabilities of the nation's critical infrastructure. They examined telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services, and continuity of government and found that the United States has substantial vulnerabilities to domestic and international threats. The conclusions recommended more antiterrorist measures be taken.<sup>95</sup> Even if every critical structure in the country became like the Fort Knox Depository, the terrorist could simply displace their target and attack something else.

To further refine the potential terrorist target list, the government agencies focus on key national special events that harness media attention. In the recent past, six U.S. events received top-priority for counterterrorism attention (see figure 16).

1. Conclusion of the World Trade Center Bombing trial in New York City
2. The Pope's visit to the United States.
3. The 50th United Nations anniversary where leaders from 140 countries gathered in New York city.
4. The Olympic Games in Atlanta.
5. The Republican Party convention in San Diego.
6. The Democratic National convention in Chicago.

**Figure 16: Top U.S. Events for Counterterrorist Protection**

For the Atlanta Olympic Games, for example, the FBI set up an interagency command center to coordinate the counterterrorist efforts. Despite years of planning and large amount of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies present, someone still managed to detonate a bomb in the Centennial Olympic Park. Vulnerabilities were reduced, but not eliminated.

In addition to identifying the nation's critical infrastructure and key national events which may be vulnerable to terrorist action, PDD-39 directs federal agencies to take antiterrorists measures to ensure the people and facilities under their jurisdiction are protected. The Secretary of Transportation is charged with reducing the vulnerabilities affecting "the security of airports in the United States; all aircraft, aviation, maritime shipping under U.S. control; and rail, highway, mass transit, and pipeline facilities." Overseas, the State Department is charged with reducing the vulnerabilities of people and facilities on nonmilitary installations and Americans in general abroad. The DOD is charged with reducing the vulnerabilities of their personnel and facilities abroad and within the U.S.<sup>96</sup>

Besides directing antiterrorists measures here and abroad, PDD-39 reduces vulnerabilities by gathering intelligence on terrorists. Intelligence collection and analysis is among "the highest priorities" of the government's counterterrorist program.<sup>97</sup> Morris Busby, a former State Department Coordinator for Counter Terrorism, recently stated before Congress, "Collecting information on terrorist groups is an essential element in our ability to track and defeat them. We need to identify the members of these groups, learn how they get their money and who provides them with training and support, track

their capabilities, and preempt their plans.”<sup>98</sup> If a terrorist plot can be discovered, it can be preempted by law enforcement agencies. In 1996, the FBI launched four preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations within the United States.<sup>99</sup> In an average year, the FBI conducts two dozen full domestic terrorism investigations, 2/3 of which were opened before the crime had been committed.<sup>100</sup> Preemption is especially important in a situation involving the potential use of a WMD.

There are numerous federal programs which assist the intelligence and law enforcement agencies in obtaining information on terrorists. The FBI's Terrorist Information System (TIS) is a database containing information on suspected terrorist groups and individuals. The TIS has information on over 200,00 individuals and 3,000 organizations.<sup>101</sup> Additionally, the FBI has formed joint terrorism task forces in 13 metropolitan areas to facilitate the exchange of intelligence across the law enforcement community. For overseas intelligence, the CIA has a Counterterrorist Center with permanent representation from numerous federal agencies to collect, analyze, and distribute national intelligence on terrorists.<sup>102</sup> The State Department's Reward for Information Program will offer rewards of up to four million dollars for information that would prevent or resolve a terrorist incident. Information from this program helped FBI agents arrest the master mind of the World Trade Center bombing.<sup>103</sup>

Unfortunately, according to Mr. Busby, using intelligence to attack the terrorist strength is one of the biggest problems in interagency cooperation. The problem is between law enforcement and the intelligence community. The intelligence community does not normally operate within the standards for evidence collecting that the law

enforcement agencies must follow. Law enforcement agencies are cautious of sharing information obtained during their investigations with the intelligence community because of legal constraints with building a case for prosecution.<sup>104</sup> This conflict points to a vulnerability of a democracy which terrorist exploit; our open society, freedom, and constitutional liberties.

### **Deter Terrorist Acts**

The counterterrorism deterrent programs are focused on disrupting the terrorist by reducing their economic support, restricting their freedom of movement, and aggressive apprehension and prosecution. An example of a deterrent program is the Antiterrorism Act of 1996. This act gives the Secretary of State power to declare an organization a foreign terrorist group. Currently there are 30 organizations on this list. It is illegal for the terrorist organizations on this list to raise funds in the United States and any funds they do have will be frozen. The Clinton Administration has recently frozen the assets of 12 alleged Middle Eastern organizations and 18 individuals associated with those organizations.<sup>105</sup> Additionally, they are ineligible for VISAs to enter the United States. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research has a "TIPOFF" data base of suspected terrorists to support consular offices overseas, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and the U.S. Custom Service's ability to intercept terrorists attempting to enter the United States. Since 1987, the TIPOFF program enabled the State Department to deny VISAs to 722 suspected terrorists and has assisted, since 1991, the INS and the Customs Service in intercepting 196 suspected terrorists at 44 of the 350

U.S. border points.<sup>106</sup> Secretary of State Albright recently stated that the goal is to make the United States, “A no-support-for-terrorists zone.”<sup>107</sup>

In addition to officially declaring an organization a foreign terrorist group, the Secretary of State has the power to disrupt terrorist support overseas by declaring a country as a state sponsor of terrorism. This declaration as a state sponsor of terrorism triggers economic sanctions. The Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control administers and the Customs Service enforces economic sanctions and embargo programs. Currently Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba are on the list and consequently over 3 billion dollars in assets are blocked.<sup>108</sup> Additionally, there are United Nations sanctions against Libya, Sudan, and Iraq.<sup>109</sup> The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 gives the federal government the authority to impose sanctions on any foreign company that engages in certain economic relations with either Iran or Libya.<sup>110</sup> Although these actions are effective against known terrorist organizations, they do little to disrupt the “unknown and new name” terrorist groups.

As a further deterrent to would-be terrorists, the federal government aggressively seeks the return of indicted terrorists to the U.S. for prosecution. The State Department works closely with the Justice Department and the FBI to apply extradition treaties to apprehend terrorists overseas. Foreign government cooperation with the United States in this effort is considered a central issue in bilateral relations. To facilitate international cooperation, the United States is active in developing and supporting international antiterrorism conventions. These conventions obligate the signatories to either prosecute terrorists or extradite them.<sup>111</sup> If a foreign government does not cooperate, the United

States, in procedures outlined in National Security Directive 77, may apprehend the terrorist without the permission or assistance of the host government.<sup>112</sup>

Another means at preventing and deterring future terrorist activity is to strike directly at terrorists organizations through covert action and military strikes. The CIA conducts covert operations to influence events in another country in which it is important to mask the U.S. government's involvement. Special operations forces have a statutory counterterrorist mission. Other than the 1986 air strike at Libya and the 1993 cruise missile strike on Iraq, much of the activity in this area is secret.<sup>113</sup> If the strategies of reducing vulnerabilities and deterrence fail, then it could mean the government will have to respond to a terrorist attack and manage its consequence.

### **Respond to Terrorism and WMD Consequence Management**

Once a terrorist incident occurs, the response and consequence management phases resemble a military operation more than the reduce vulnerability or deterrence phases. For incidents within the United States, the FBI, as the lead agency, manages the crises until resolved and then conducts the criminal investigation in order to pursue, arrest, and prosecute the terrorist. At the incident cite, the on-scene FBI commander (usually the Special Agent-in-Charge of the local FBI office) will establish a command post to manage the crises. If the terrorist threat exceeds the abilities of the local FBI office, then the FBI Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) is deployed to assist the office. This group has crisis managers, hostage negotiators, behaviorists, surveillance assets, and a trained tactical team, the Hostage Rescue Unit (HRT, see reference for details).<sup>114</sup> For assistance in coordinating other federal agency responses, the FBI director



can deploy the Domestic Emergency Support Team (DEST). If the terrorist incident exceeds the capability of the FBI, then a military joint special operations task force may be established with the concurrence of the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense and, in most instances, the President. If military force is approved, then the on-site FBI commander passes operational control to the military commander until the military task is accomplished. If the incident is not resolved peacefully, a military operation has to be approved by the National Command Authority (NCA, President and Secretary of Defense).<sup>115</sup>

For incidents outside the United States, the State Department has the lead. The crisis will be managed at the embassy by a Emergency Action Committee headed by the Ambassador. The Foreign Emergency Support Team (FEST) may be deployed upon approval of the host government. At the State Department headquarters, a 24 hour task force would be formed to coordinate federal efforts from the U.S. to the embassy and host government. If the terrorist incident involves a WMD, then the consequence will require considerable interagency effort.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the lead agency in coordinating the federal response for management of a consequence of a WMD incident. To integrate the federal response, FEMA chairs the Senior Interagency Coordination Group on Terrorism (SICG) which focuses on emergency response training for WMD incidents. The federal government does not have the lead responsibility in consequence management, but supports the state and local governments inside the United States or the host government outside the country.<sup>116</sup> Over 150 million dollars is allocated from FY97

to FY99 federal budgets for WMD consequence management.<sup>117</sup> This federal assistance is welcomed by the National Governors Association who believe the states are not adequately resourced or trained for WMD consequence response.<sup>118</sup> The state and local first responders, firemen and policemen, are essentially on their own for the first six to ten hours after an incident has occurred.<sup>119</sup> In support of FEMA, the DOD has plans to train the first responders, state and local emergency organizations in 120 cities across the U.S., on how to detect, protect, monitor, and decontaminate in WMD incidents.<sup>120</sup> Additionally, DOD has formed a Response Task Force (RTF) and a Chemical Biological Quick Response Force (CBQRF) that are under 24 hour alert status and can deploy advance teams within four hours upon receiving orders. The rest of the CBQRF can deploy in 18 hours. The CBQRF would fall under the RTF which would have operational control over the DOD response forces. The CBQRF's mission is to "detect, neutralize, contain, dismantle, and dispose of WDM."<sup>121</sup>

### **Summary**

PDD-39 is the "central blueprint" of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.<sup>122</sup> It based on policies that have evolved over twenty-five years. PDD-39 takes standing U.S. policy and elaborates a strategy for combating terrorism through the integration of efforts through out the federal government. The strategy is based on integrating federal efforts to reducing vulnerabilities, deter a terrorist attack, respond to an incident, and manage the consequence of terrorist incidents, including those involving a WMD. Is this effort to link strategic guidance to tactical action operational art?

## Chapter Four: The United States Counterterrorism Program and Operational Art

As stated before, operational art is the method of linking strategic objectives into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action.<sup>123</sup> As Soviet theorist learned in the 1920s and the U.S. Army in the 1980s, military operations must be linked to the strategic objectives. Operational art is both a linking and a creative process. It links the strategic objectives to military operations by identifying the military conditions, the *ends*, which will achieve the strategic objective. It uses the creative process of campaign design (centers of gravity, decisive points, lines of operation, culmination) to develop the courses of action, the *ways*, which will achieve the *ends*. Campaign design is a creative process because, like an artist, the design requires cognitive interpretation and analysis. A sculpture comes out of the artist's mind and not his chisel. The same is true for campaign design. The chisel of a campaign design are the military resources, the *means*. Is this process which evolved from the environment of conventional conflict, useful in the very different environment of countering terrorism? To answer this question, the same thought process will be applied in examining PDD-39. Although the environments of conventional conflict and terrorism are completely different, the thought process may not be.

The strategic objective of the United States in regards to terrorism is to "use all appropriate means to deter, defeat, and respond to all terrorist attacks on our territory and resources, both people and facilities, wherever they occur."<sup>124</sup> Counterterrorist planners must identify the interagency conditions, the *ends*, which will achieve this strategic

objectives. In the case of PDD-39, these conditions are the United States counterterrorist polices (see figure 17).

1. "Employ efforts to deter, preempt, apprehend and prosecute terrorists."
2. "Work closely with other governments to carry out our counterterrorism policy and combat terrorist threats against them."
3. "Identify sponsors of terrorists, isolate them, and ensure they pay for their actions."
4. "Make no concessions to terrorists."

**Figure 17: The Ends (U.S. Counterterrorist Policies)<sup>125</sup>**

These conditions are not as concrete as military conditions, but they accomplish the strategic objective. These conditions go across the federal government to implement. Campaign design, the *ways*, are what actions are needed to achieve these *ends*.

Campaign design is based on the conventional conflict environment. If the purpose of each of the fundamentals of campaign design are used, then they might be useful in the counterterrorist environment. PDD-39 does not directly state a center of gravity or any other fundamentals of campaign design, but they can be inferred by examining how the strategy is designed.

The key to campaign design is the center of gravity. The purpose behind identifying the center of gravity is to focus one's efforts at what gives one power. It is identified both for one's self and the enemy. The key is to protect one's own center of gravity, while attacking the enemy's. Centers of gravity are more abstract at the strategic level and more concrete at the operational level. What gives those who commit terrorism power is being terrorist. A terrorist is a type of *means*, that is, a resource, like a soldier, to implement the *ways* to achieve the *ends*. The *means* of being a terrorist gives those who commit terrorism their power. A terrorist is usually not a visible combatant. They are able to move around and operate in a free society, oblivious to those around them, and conduct

their terrible acts. Terrorists thus protect their identity, their center of gravity, by remaining unknown. This is directly related to a United States vulnerability, its free and open society. The *ends* for a terrorist is to intimidate or coerce an audience through the threat or use of violence, their *ways*, by *means* of explosives, hijacking, WMD, and other tools. They can accomplish their *ends* by attacking the United States center of gravity.

A center of gravity of the United States which terrorist could attack is its free and open society. The Constitution of the United States is based on a free and open society (see figure 18 ).

*"We the people* of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, *insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defense*, promote the general Welfare, and *secure the Blessings of Liberty* to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America."

**Figure 18: Preamble to the U.S. Constitution<sup>126</sup>**

The Constitution is what gives the U.S. its power, "the blessings of liberty." Interesting, while the preamble to the Constitution identifies the power of liberty, it also ensures this power is protected. PDD-39 is cognitively based on protecting the United States center of gravity. PDD-39 protects the free and open society by reducing the United States vulnerabilities and deterring terrorists attacks. It specifically directs seven strategies to reduce vulnerabilities (see figure 19 ).

1. Review the vulnerability of government facilities and critical national infrastructure
2. Expand the program of counterterrorism.
3. Reduce vulnerabilities of affecting civilian personnel/facilities abroad and military personnel/facilities.
4. Reduce vulnerabilities affecting U.S. airports, aircraft/passengers and shipping, and provide appropriate security measures for other modes of transportation.
5. Exclude/deport persons who pose a terrorist threat.
6. Prevent unlawful traffic in firearms and explosives, and protect the President and other officials against terrorist attack.
7. Reduce U.S. vulnerabilities to international terrorism through intelligence collection/analysis, counterintelligence and covert actions.

**Figure 19: Strategies to Reduce Vulnerabilities<sup>127</sup>**


PDD-39 directs various agencies, the *means*, to implement actions in support of these strategies. For example, it directs the identification and increased protection of the nation's critical infrastructure; the identification of key national events, such as the Atlanta Olympics, which could be potential targets; and directs antiterrorist measures for people and facilities.

PDD-39 protects the U.S. center of gravity by deterring terrorists from attacking. It deters attacks by demonstrating to would be terrorists the consequences enacted against those who commit and support terrorism. Being declared a terrorist group or a state supporter of terrorism has enormous detrimental economic consequences. A terrorist is not free from the prospect of arrest or attack anywhere in the world. These strategies of reducing vulnerabilities and deterrence reduce the chances of terrorism but can not eliminate it. It is physically impossible to protect everything and not all groups will be deterred. The strategic objective does not require the elimination of terrorism, only to use all "appropriate *means*."

Simultaneously with protecting the United States center of gravity, PDD-39 attacks the terrorist center of gravity. If terrorists are known then they can be attacked directly or indirectly. PDD-39 attacks terrorists directly when identified through the strategies of responding to terrorism. The lead agencies of the FBI and the State Department operate in essentially two distinct theaters, overseas and domestically, to coordinate the federal response to a terrorist incident. Terrorists are inherently weak and vulnerable to direct attack. Being a terrorist, however, gives them strength by remaining anonymous to those around them, enabling freedom of movement and action. The

implication is they can not be attacked directly. Therefore, counterterrorist have to attack terrorist indirectly through decisive points. Success against the decisive points may increase the vulnerability of the center of gravity for direct attack and subsequent defeat.

PDD-39 attacks terrorists indirectly by denying them the advantage of being a terrorist (see figure 20 ). PDD-39 does this by attacking the decisive points of anonymity and movement. Anonymity is what enables a terrorists to operate oblivious to those around them. That is why intelligence collection and analysis are among the highest priorities in the U.S. counterterrorist program. Anonymity directly relates to the other decisive point of movement. If the terrorists are known, they can be restricted on their movement through the denial of VISAs and access into this country at the various points of entry.



**Figure 20: Center of Gravity and Decisive Points**

International conventions and extradition treaties limit the movement of terrorist around the world. An international terrorist operating in the United States does not have lines of operations in the traditional sense, but seizing of their funds and restrictions in access into the U.S. is a form of cutting them off from their base of operations. For state terrorist



groups, their base is directly attacked through economic sanctions on their state sponsors. Terrorist groups reach culmination when they no longer have the *means* and/or the will to conduct their attacks. Their will can be affected through the counterterrorist deterrence programs. With terrorism at a twenty-five year low, terrorists groups may be lacking in the *means* or the will to conduct their attacks.

### **Chapter Five: Conclusion**

Operational art, an operational concept developed as an analytical tool for conventional conflict, is useful for an asymmetrical conflict of countering terrorism. PDD-39 has identified the interagency conditions, the *ends*, to accomplish the nation's strategic counterterrorist objectives. It used campaign design, the *ways*, to accomplish the *ends*, through the *means* of the various government departments and agencies. Therefore, PDD-39 linked the strategic objectives into operational design, and ultimately, tactical action. Although countering terrorism is a much different environment than conventional conflict, the cognitive process of linking action on the ground to the strategic objectives is similar in construct.

PDD-39's campaign design was similar in purpose to the military's model, yet differed in structure. The military's decisive points are usually geographic in nature. The counterterrorist decisive points, anonymity and movement, are more abstract. This is due to the difference in environment. The military bases campaign design on a known enemy threat. PDD-39 is based a terrorist capability, not a specific threat. The military's decisive points lead to the center of gravity and ultimately, victory. The counterterrorist decisive points lead to the center of gravity, but there is no final victory in countering terrorism.

The strategic objective does not envision absolute victory over terrorism, only controlling it. Countering terrorism is more analogous to fighting crimes than fighting wars. The crime rate can not be eliminated, but it can be reduced and controlled.

Operational art can be applied for interagency counterterrorist operations. It would be especially useful, for example, to the FBI which is currently developing a WMD counterterrorism interagency contingency plan. Campaign design warrants further study by counterterrorist experts who might see other centers of gravity or decisive points. It is quite possible, however, that experts from other fields such as law enforcement may see a much different type of campaign design, not based on the military's model. This type of thinking and dialogue is important for the continued evolvement of operational art in the interagency counterterrorist environment.

Interesting, both Grant in his ultimately successful final campaign at Vicksburg and the creators of PDD-39 were not doctrinally instructed on operational art, but it is apparent that they understood the cognitive process. Both Grant and the creators of PDD-39 understood the process due to their background and experience. Grant's experience at Vicksburg was based on many frustrating and failed attempts to seize the town. The strategies of PDD-39 evolved over the twenty-five years since the U.S. was spurred to develop a counterterrorism program in the wake of the terrorism incident at the Munich Olympics.

Operational art needs to be formally applied to the interagency counterterrorist field. Operational art is not magic, but a logical, common-sense, creative method of accomplishing objectives. It requires, however, certain understanding of the relationship

between the *ends*, *ways*, and *means*. Although Grant, in his ultimately successful campaign at Vicksburg in 1864 and in later campaigns of the Civil War, intuitively understood operational art, it did not become U.S. Army doctrine until 1986. What can be learned can be forgotten.

## **Appendix I: Operational Acronyms and Abbreviations**

ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
BW	Biological Weapon
CBQRF	Chemical Biological Quick Response Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander in Chief
CIRG	Critical Incident Response Group
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CW	Chemical Weapon
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DEST	Domestic Emergency Support Team
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DOMS	Director of Military Support
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
EST	Emergency Support Team
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FEST	Foreign Emergency Support Team
FRP	Federal Response Program
GAO	General Accounting Office
HHS	Health and Human Services
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IWG	Interagency Working Group
NBC	Nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authority
NSC	National Security Council
NSC/IWG	National Security Council Interagency Working Group
NSC/PC	National Security Council Principals Committee
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
RTF	Response Task Force
S/CT	Coordinator of Counterterrorism
TIS	Terrorist Information System
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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<sup>1</sup> U.S. Army, FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics (Washington: Department of the Army, September 1997), 1-114.

<sup>2</sup> Braham, Carol G., editor, Random House Webster's Dictionary (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996), 681. Note: There are subtle differences within the U.S. government on defining terrorism. The DOD, FBI, and State Department definition of terrorism are nearly identical, but reveal each organization's perspective.

**DOD:** "The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inoculate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological." (Joint Pub 1-02)

**FBI:** "The unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."

**Department of State:** "Premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." (Patterns of Global Terrorism, vi)

<sup>3</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Peret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87.

<sup>4</sup> Braham, 683.

<sup>5</sup> Trinquier, Roger, Modern Warfare, A French View of Counterinsurgency (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 16 and 23.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>8</sup> U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, June 1993), 2-1. The U.S. Army recognizes three "states of the environment" that exists: war, conflict, and peacetime (see figure 16 ). Counterterrorism occurs in conflict and war; antiterrorism occurs across the in peacetime, conflict, and war (13-7).

States of the Environment	Goal	Military Operations	Examples
War	Fight & Win	War	Large Scale Combt Operations Counter Terrorism Anti Terrorism
Conflict	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Other Than War	Strikes & Raids Peace Enforcement Counter Terrorism Anti Terrorism
Peacetime	Promote Peace	Other Than War	Counterdrug Disaster relief Civil support Anti Terrorism

**Figure 16: States of the Environment**

<sup>9</sup> General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism (<http://www.jya.com/nsiad-98-39.htm>) 5 December 1997, 6.

<sup>10</sup> Ferrell, William Regis, The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism, In Search of an Effective Strategy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982), 54.

<sup>11</sup> Tucker, David, Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 48.

<sup>12</sup> FBI, Terrorism in the United States 1995 (<http://www.fbi.gov/publish/terror/terrusa.htm>), 5.

<sup>13</sup> USIA Electronic Journal 2/97, "New Counterterrorism Law," (<http://198.80.36/journals/itgic/0297/ijge/gj-6.htm>), Note: 1. Details of the "Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996"

- "Prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to governments that provide assistance or lethal military equipment to terrorist-list governments."
- "Prohibits sales or licenses for export of defense articles or defense services to countries the president determines are not fully cooperating with U.S. antiterrorism efforts."
- "Authorizes exclusion of aliens who are members or representatives of foreign terrorists groups designated as such by the Secretary of State."
- "Directs the Federal Aviation Administration to require foreign air carriers serving the United States to use the identical security measures utilized by U.S. carriers."

<sup>14</sup> Trinquier, xv.

<sup>15</sup> Kitfield, James, "The Age of Superterrorism," (Government Executive, June 1995), 6.

<sup>16</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now --A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington: The Joint Staff, 1997), 1.

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- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., 1.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., 4.
- <sup>19</sup> FBI, 1995, 2.
- <sup>20</sup> Peters, Katherine M., "Deadly Strike," (<http://govexec.com/features/0797s2.htm>), July 1997, 2.
- <sup>21</sup> Wilcox, Ambassador Phillip, "Special Briefing on the Release of *Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1996*." (<http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1996report/970430.html>), April 30, 1997, 6.
- <sup>22</sup> National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense, National Security in the 21st Century (Arlington: National Defense Panel, December 1997), 8-9.
- <sup>23</sup> U.S. Army, FM 100-20 Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington: Department of the Army, December 1990). 3-11.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid., 3-11.
- <sup>25</sup> Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations (Washington: The Joint Staff, 15 December 1995), 1-12.
- <sup>26</sup> Peters, 3.
- <sup>27</sup> Office of Technology Assessment, Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, December 1993), 77.
- <sup>28</sup> Peters, 6.
- <sup>30</sup> Feldstein, Mark, "U.S. Senate Probes Doomsday Cult Link," ([http://cnn.com/WORLD/9510/japan\\_asahara/10-31/index.html](http://cnn.com/WORLD/9510/japan_asahara/10-31/index.html)), CNN World News, 31 October 1995, 1.
- <sup>31</sup> The Henry L. Stimson Center, The CWC Chronicle (<http://www.stimson.org/cwc/chron8.htm>), Volume I, Issue 8, September 1995, 1.
- <sup>32</sup> The Henry L. Stimson Center, "First Anniversary of Tokyo Subway Poison Gas Attack," (<http://www.stimson.org/cwc/issuebrf.htm>), 1.
- <sup>33</sup> Kozaryn, Linda D., "Terrorism Declines but Threat Remains High," ([www.dtic.dla.mil/afps/news/9705031.html](http://www.dtic.dla.mil/afps/news/9705031.html)), American Forces Press Service 97344, 1.
- <sup>34</sup> Johnson, Larry C., "The Fall of Terrorism," 1996., 1.
- <sup>35</sup> Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1997), 51.
- <sup>36</sup> General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (<http://jya.com/nsiad-97-254.txt>), 6 Nov 1997, 9.

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<sup>37</sup> The White House "Executive Order # 12938, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," (<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12938.htm>), 14 November 1994, 1. Note: "The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce shall use their respective authorities, including the Arms Export Control Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, to control any exports, to the extent they are not already controlled by the Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, that either Secretary determines would assist a country in acquiring the capability to develop, produce, stockpile, deliver, or use WMD or their means of delivery."

<sup>38</sup> The White House, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington: The White House, May 1997), 6.

<sup>39</sup> Menning, Bruce W., "Operational Art's Origins" (Military Review, September-October 1997), 44.

<sup>40</sup> Epstein, Dr. Robert M., Napoleon's Last Victory: 1809 and the Emergence of Modern War (Fort Leavenworth, School of Advance Military Studies, 1992), 11.

<sup>41</sup> Schneider, James J., Theoretical Paper No. 4, Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth: School of Advanced Military Studies, 16 June 1991), 18.

<sup>42</sup> Kipp, Jacop W., "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern Warfare: Military History and Military Theory," in Strategy, edited by Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, East View Publications, 1992), 23.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 25.

<sup>44</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 6-2.

<sup>45</sup> Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 52.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

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<sup>48</sup> Schneider, James J. Ph.d., Theoretical Paper No. 3: The Theory of Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), 9.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

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<sup>51</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 6-2

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<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

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<sup>57</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1997, 1-24.

<sup>58</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 6-7.

<sup>59</sup> Musicant, 237.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 242.

<sup>61</sup> Ballard, 21.

<sup>62</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1997, 1-46.

<sup>63</sup> Steele, Matthew Forney, American Campaign, Vol 1 (Washington: Byron S. Adams, 1909), 402.

<sup>64</sup> Ballard, 14.

<sup>65</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 6-7.

<sup>66</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1997, 1-43.

<sup>67</sup> Steele, 406.

<sup>68</sup> Musicant, 289.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 288.

<sup>70</sup> Ballard, 24.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 53.

<sup>72</sup> FM 100-5, Operations, 1993, 2-5

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 2-5.

<sup>74</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 5.

<sup>75</sup> General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism (<http://www.jya.com/nsiad-98-39.htm>), 5 December 1997, 3.

<sup>76</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 5.

<sup>77</sup> General Accounting Office, 5 December 1997, 2.

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- <sup>80</sup> Ibid., 5.
- <sup>81</sup> Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, 1996, I-II-2.
- <sup>82</sup> Ibid., I-15.
- <sup>83</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 6.
- <sup>84</sup> Ibid., 7.
- <sup>85</sup> Joint Staff, Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (Washington: The Joint Staff, 24 February 1993), viii.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid., viii.
- <sup>87</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Handbook 5260, Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness (Washington: The Joint Staff, 1 January 1997), 6.
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- <sup>89</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 5.
- <sup>90</sup> Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces, 1993, vi.
- <sup>91</sup> The White House, PDD-39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism (<http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39.htm>), 21 June 1995, 2.
- <sup>92</sup> National Security Council, "Unclassified FEMA Abstract on PDD-39," ([http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39\\_fema.htm](http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd39_fema.htm)), 5 June 1996, 1.
- <sup>93</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 3.
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- <sup>95</sup> President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, "Critical Foundations, Protecting America's Infrastructure," (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 13, 1997), x-xi.
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- <sup>97</sup> Ibid., 19.
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- <sup>102</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 20.
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- <sup>105</sup> Perl, 5.
- <sup>106</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 23.
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- <sup>112</sup> PDD-39, U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism, 4.
- <sup>113</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 22.
- <sup>114</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 28. "The Hostage Rescue Team, which is authorized 90 special agents, is expected to deploy rapidly upon notice of the FBI Director's authorization to rescue individuals who are held illegally by hostile force. The FBI also has over 1,000 agents in Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams located in its field offices."
- <sup>115</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 31.
- <sup>116</sup> Ibid., 23.
- <sup>117</sup> Department of Defense, 1 May 1997, 15.
- <sup>118</sup> Ibid., 7.
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- <sup>120</sup> General Accounting Office, 6 Nov 1997, 15.
- <sup>121</sup> Ibid., 21.
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<sup>123</sup> FM 101-5-1, Operational Terms and Graphics, 1997, 1-114.

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